The Universal Church, Inc. v. Universal Life Church/ULC Monastery by Southern District of New York
1 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
----------------------------------------X 
THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH, INC., 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
  - against - 
 
UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH/ULC MONASTERY  
d/b/a THE UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH,  
UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH MONASTERY 
STOREHOUSE, GEORGE FREEMAN, BRUCE TAYLOR, 
CALVIN TOELLNER and DANIEL CHAPIN, 
 
Defendants. 
----------------------------------------X 
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM & ORDER 
 
14 Civ. 5213 (NRB) 
 
 
 
Plaintiff brings this trademark infringement action in 
connection with its registration of various marks, including 
“Universal Church” and “The Universal Church.”  Plaintiff asserts 
trademark infringement claims under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1114(1), 1125(a), claims under the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), and state law claims for 
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and deceptive business 
practices.  See First Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15).  Both parties have 
moved for summary judgment.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
grant defendants’ motion and deny plaintiff’s motion.  In doing 
so, we hold that “Universal Church” and “The Universal Church” are 
generic marks and that, even if they were not, plaintiff could not 
establish likelihood of confusion.  
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BACKGROUND1 
I. Factual Background 
A. Parties 
Plaintiff, The Universal Church, Inc., is a 
Pentecostal/Charismatic church.  Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 2.  It 
was incorporated in New York on May 5, 1987, as a not-for-profit 
corporation and has its principal place of business in New Jersey.  
Id. ¶ 1.  Plaintiff is spiritually affiliated with, but legally 
independent of, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, a 
Brazilian church founded in 1977.  Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 3-
5.  Plaintiff has “around 30,000 members,” while plaintiff’s 
Brazilian affiliate has millions of members.  Zibas Decl. (ECF No. 
91), Ex. B at 21:15-19; 144:23-25; see also Pl.’s Opp. MSJ (ECF 
No. 113) at 16.2   
Defendant Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse, Inc. 
(“ULC”) was incorporated in Washington State on September 13, 2006, 
                     
1 The following is taken from the parties’ statements of material facts 
pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 and is considered undisputed unless otherwise noted.  
At oral argument, the parties confirmed that all material evidence had been 
submitted in connection with the present motions and that no additional material 
evidence would be presented if the case were to proceed to trial.  See Oral 
Arg. Tr. (ECF No. 138) at 23:7-15. 
2 At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel disputed that plaintiff has “only” 
30,000 members.  Counsel claimed that the figure was “far more” but was unable 
to provide an alternative figure.  See Oral Arg. Tr. (ECF No. 138) at 18:21-
19:6.  Given that plaintiff’s own vice-president and 30(b)(6) witness affirmed 
the 30,000 figure, see Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 11 at 21:15-19 (“Q How 
many members do you have of [sic] The Universal Church, Inc., church members 
[sic]?  A We have around 30,000 members.”), and the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, we take the figure as undisputed for summary judgment. 
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as a not-for-profit corporation.  Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 16-
17.3  Prior to that, ULC was an unincorporated association.  Id. 
¶ 18.  Defendant ULC describes itself as a “a non-denominational, 
non-profit organization” that “recogniz[es] the importance of 
maintaining open hearts and minds, embracing any individual, no 
matter his spiritual background, who wishes to become a member of 
this family of faith.”  Id. ¶ 30.  It offers free ordinations to 
its members.  Id. ¶ 31.  It is an offshoot of a church founded in 
California in the 1950s that was initially called the “Universal 
Church.”  Id. ¶¶ 22, 23, 27.  There are other “Universal Life 
Churches” that are offshoots of the original church but are not 
affiliated with defendants.  Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. 
Defendant Universal Life Church/ULC Monastery is affiliated 
with defendant ULC.  Oral Arg. Tr. (ECF No. 138) at 23:16-24:7.  
The four individual defendants are current or former officers of 
one of the corporate defendants.  Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶ 19.   
                     
3 Plaintiff responded to and/or disputed several statements in defendants’ 
56.1 statement by noting that it “lacks information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth of this unverified assertion.”  See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp. 56.1 (ECF 
No. 114) ¶¶ 16-18, 22-23.  We treat such statements as undisputed for purposes 
of summary judgment.  See S.D.N.Y. LR 56.1(c) (“Each numbered paragraph in the 
statement of material facts . . . will be deemed to be admitted for purposes of 
the motion unless specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered 
paragraph in the statement required to be served by the opposing party.”); id. 
56.1(d) (“Each statement by the . . . opponent . . . , including each statement 
controverting any statement of material fact, must be followed by citation to 
evidence which would be admissible . . . .”). 
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B. Trademarks at Issue 
This lawsuit involves three trademarks registered by 
plaintiff: “Universal Church,” “The Universal Church,” and 
“Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.”4  Two of the marks——
”Universal Church” and “Universal Church of the Kingdom of God”——
were registered in January 2006.  Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 38, 
47.  The marks were registered with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) for use in “evangelistic and 
ministerial services, namely, conducting religious worship 
services.”  Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 5(a), (b).  The registration 
certificates state that the marks were first used in commerce in 
May 1987.  Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 39, 48.  In February 2012, 
the USPTO issued Notices of Acceptance under Sections 8 and 15 of 
the Lanham Act granting incontestable status to the marks.  Id. 
¶¶ 41, 50.   
The third mark, “The Universal Church,” was registered in 
April 2012 and has not reached incontestable status.  Id. ¶¶ 43, 
46.  It is registered for use in “religious counseling and 
ministerial services,” “newsletters and informational brochures 
all about religious beliefs and practices,” and “t-shirts 
                     
4 Plaintiff’s motion papers reference a fourth mark, “The Universal Church 
of the Kingdom of God,” registration number 3,930,709.  See Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 
103) ¶ 5(d) (emphasis added).  Defendants object to its consideration since it 
was not identified in the first amended complaint as a trademark at issue.  In 
any event, no such mark appears to exist.  The mark that is registered under 
number 3,930,709 is “Universal Church of the Kingdom of God,” without a 
preceding “The.”  See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 7.  
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distributed in connection with religious groups.”  Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF 
No. 103) ¶ 5(c). 
In 2009, defendants attempted to register “Universal Life 
Church” and several similar marks.  The USPTO rejected the mark on 
the grounds that there was a likelihood of confusion with other 
registered applications, including “Universal Church” and “Life 
Church.”  Although defendants were afforded the opportunity to 
submit evidence and arguments in response, they instead choose to 
abandon their applications.5 
C. Defendants’ Use of the Trademarks 
Plaintiff claims that defendants use the trademarks at issue 
in one of five general ways: (1) by registering domain names, 
including universalchurch.org, containing the phrase “universal 
church”; (2) by using the “Universal Church” on the 
universalchurch.org website; (3) by using the “Universal Church” 
in the website’s metadata so that the website’s name shows up as 
“The Universal Church” in search results; (4) by bidding on 
advertising keywords, including “the universal church,” so that 
defendants’ websites appear in Internet search engine ads; and (5) 
by “hijacking” map-based searches so that defendants’ website is 
                     
5 Having found the parties’ submissions on this point lacking, we take 
judicial notice of the defendants’ trademark applications, which are available 
on the USPTO’s website, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov.  See Rockland Exposition, 
Inc. v. All. of Auto. Serv. Providers of N.J., 894 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 n.6 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), as amended (Sept. 19, 2012) (taking judicial notice of online 
trademark registration information). 
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associated with the location of plaintiff’s churches.  These uses 
are explained in greater detail below. 
1. Registering Domain Names that Incorporate 
“Universal Church”  
Defendants registered 17 domain names containing the phrase 
“universal church.”  Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 18.  The domain 
name that is central to this lawsuit is universalchurch.org, which 
defendants registered in 2010.  Id. ¶ 24.6  The domain names were 
all registered by defendants between 2009 and 2013.  Id. ¶¶ 21-
29. 
2. Use of “The Universal Church” on Defendants’ 
Websites 
Defendants used the phrase “universal church” in various ways 
on the website hosted at universalchurch.org.  For example, the 
mark appears at the website’s top left corner and in the website’s 
text, as shown below:  
                     
6 Defendants also registered universalchurch.co, universalchurch.info, 
universalchurch.mobi, universalchurch.mx, universalchurch.net, 
theuniversalchurch.org, universalchurchoflife.org, universalchurchonline.com, 
universalchurchonline.net, univeralchurchonline.org, 
universalchurchsupplies.com, universalchurchsupplies.net, 
universalchurchsupplies.org, universalchurchsupply.com, 
universalchurchsupply.net, universalchurchsupply.org.  See Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 
102) at 7 n.2. 
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Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 36 (screenshot of universalchurch.org 
homepage taken on January 5, 2014); see also id. ¶¶ 31-33 
(screenshots and descriptions of website’s content on different 
dates).   At various times, the website also included a link to 
defendants’ website, themonastery.org, through which defendants 
offer online ordination services.  Id. ¶ 30. 
Plaintiff also claims that the website contained “defamatory 
content” about the founder of the Universal Church of the Kingdom 
of God, id. ¶ 40, and explained that “‘Universal Church’ is a 
registered trademark.  The sponsor of this website is the Universal 
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Life Church, unaffiliated with the legally recognized trademark 
holder, ‘Universal Church, Inc.,’” id. ¶ 31.7   
3. Use of “The Universal Church” in Website 
Metadata 
Defendants have also used “The Universal Church” as the “title 
tag” in the HTML metadata for universalchurch.org.  The effect is 
that a search result for the website appears as follows: 
  
Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 40 (screenshot of partial Google search 
result).  
4. Bidding on “Universal Church” as a Keyword 
Search Term 
Plaintiff next claims that defendants bid on certain keyword 
search terms in order to place “pay-per-click” ads.8  Pl.’s 56.1 
                     
7 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s screenshots of the universalchurch.org 
website, which are taken from archive.org’s Wayback Machine, have not been 
authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence 901.  However, plaintiff submitted 
with its reply an affidavit from an archive.org employee, see Daniels Decl. 
(ECF No. 125), Ex. 1, which courts in this Circuit have generally accepted as 
sufficient for authentication purposes, see, e.g., Foster v. Lee, 93 F. Supp. 
3d 223, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Mahmood v. Research in Motion Ltd., No. 11 CIV. 
5345 KBF, 2012 WL 242836, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2012).  In addition, 
courts have taken judicial notice of screenshots taken from the Wayback Machine 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.  See, e.g., Distributorsoutlet.com, LLC v. 
Glasstree, Inc., No. 11-CV-6079(PKC)(SLT), 2016 WL 3248310, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 10, 2016).   
8 Search engines such as Google generally return two types of search 
results: “organic” results and ads.  Organic results are those that the search 
engine’s algorithm believes are most relevant to the particular search.  Ads, 
in contrast, are bought by bidding on a particular keyword, such that an ad 
appears above the organic search results when someone searches for that keyword. 
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(ECF No. 103) ¶ 43.  Defendants do not dispute that they bid on 
the phrase “the universal church,” but do dispute that they bid on 
“universal church” and “universal church of the kingdom of god.”  
Def.’s Opp. 56.1 (ECF No. 121) ¶ 43.9   
5. “Hijacking” Location-Based Search Results 
Finally, plaintiff claims that the search results for its 
physical church locations in location-based search engines have 
become associated with defendants’ websites, a process known as 
“hijacking.”  Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶¶ 46-48.  For example, 
plaintiff claims that the Google Maps search result for its church 
at 1077 Southern Boulevard in the Bronx was linked to defendants’ 
website, themonastery.org, as shown below: 
 
                     
9 Plaintiff relies on the testimony of an employee of the company that 
optimized defendants’ search optimization strategy.  The employee was asked 
whether the list of words that defendants bid on “include[s] Universal Church, 
The Universal Church, or the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.”  Zibas 
Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex. BB at 17:21-24 (emphasis added).  The employee responded 
affirmatively, but given the disjunctive framing of the question, it is not 
clear whether he was testifying that defendants had bid on all three marks or 
at least one mark.  The employee later did clarify that defendants had bid on 
at least “the universal church.”  Id. at 20:4-6.   
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Id. ¶ 47.  Plaintiff’s expert claims to have found 290 such 
instances.  Id. ¶ 46.  However, the parties dispute whether 
defendants are responsible for the hijacking and whether any such 
hijacking is attributable to defendants’ “use” of the trademarks 
in question.  Compare Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 46, with Def.’s 
Opp. 56.1 (ECF No. 121) ¶ 46.  
II. Procedural Background 
Plaintiff filed suit on July 11, 2014, see Compl. (ECF No. 
2), and filed its first amended complaint on November 18, 2015, 
see First Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15).  The first amended complaint 
asserts three types of claims: (1) that defendants’ use of 
plaintiff’s trademarks constitutes trademark infringement under 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a); (2) that 
defendants’ registration of certain domain names violates the 
federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(d); (3) that defendants have engaged in deceptive business 
practices in violation of Sections 349 and 350 of the New York 
General Business Law; and (4) that defendants’ conduct constitutes 
trademark infringement and unfair competition under New York state 
common law.  See id. 
Defendants answered the first amended complaint on January 
12, 2015, and also brought counterclaims seeking (1) a declaratory 
judgment that plaintiff’s trademarks are invalid and 
unenforceable; (2) cancellation of the marks; and (3) a declaratory 
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judgment that defendants have not infringed on plaintiff’s 
trademarks even if they are valid.  See Answer (ECF No. 24). 
Both parties moved for summary judgment.  See ECF Nos. 84, 
92.  We heard oral argument on the parties’ motions on July 11, 
2017, and allowed both parties to file post-oral argument 
supplemental briefs.  See ECF Nos. 133, 137.   
DISCUSSION 
I. Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a).  “A fact is ‘material’ when it might affect the outcome 
of the suit under governing law.”  McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet 
Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  A genuine dispute exists if a reasonable factfinder 
could decide in the nonmoving party’s favor.  Id.   
A court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all justifiable 
factual inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).  The moving party 
must “make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary 
judgment.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986).  
If the moving party puts forth such a showing, the party opposing 
summary judgment must then present “sufficient evidence favoring 
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the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”  
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. 
II. Federal Trademark Claims 
Plaintiff asserts federal trademark infringement claims under 
Sections 1114(1) and 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1114(1), 1125(a).  We analyze claims brought under either 
provision by applying a well-established two-prong test:  We 
determine, “first . . . whether the plaintiff’s mark is entitled 
to protection, and second . . . whether defendant’s use of the 
mark is likely to cause consumers confusion as to the origin or 
sponsorship of the defendant’s goods.”  Virgin Enterps. Ltd. v. 
Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2003).   
A. “Universal Church” Is Generic and Not Entitled to 
Trademark Protection10 
Defendants first argue that “Universal Church” is not 
entitled to protection because it is a generic rather than 
descriptive mark.  
1. Standard 
Potential trademarks are divided into five categories of 
distinctiveness that reflect the degree, in ascending order, to 
which they are eligible to be trademarked and protected: (1) 
                     
10 Defendants conceded at oral argument that they are not contesting 
whether “Universal Church of the Kingdom of God” is generic.  See Oral Arg. Tr. 
(ECF No. 138) at 2:7-10.  Given the similarity between “The Universal Church” 
and “Universal Church” marks, we treat them interchangeably unless noted 
otherwise. 
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generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5) 
fanciful.  Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 
F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).11  As the Second Circuit has noted, 
however, “[t]he lines of demarcation . . . are not always bright.”  
Id.  
“A descriptive mark describes a product’s features, qualities 
or ingredients in ordinary language, or describes the use to which 
a product is put.”  Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 
F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citations omitted).  Such a mark “may be registered only if the 
registrant shows that it has acquired secondary meaning, i.e., it 
has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.”  Park 
‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); 
15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (f).  The USPTO “may accept as prima facie 
evidence that the mark has become distinctive . . . proof of 
substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by 
the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on 
which the claim of distinctiveness is made.”  15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).   
In contrast, a “generic mark is generally a common description 
of goods, one that refers, or has come to be understood as 
referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a 
                     
11 The last three categories, which are inapplicable here, are “‘inherently 
distinctive,’ and are automatically entitled to protection under the Lanham 
Act.”  Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
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species.”  Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 143 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citations omitted).  “Generic names use common 
words that are synonymous with the nature of the organization.”  
Cancer Research Inst., Inc. v. Cancer Research Soc’y, Inc., 694 F. 
Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).  In other words, a generic mark 
is one that answers the question “What are you?” while a valid 
trademark answers “Who are you?”  See 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and 
Unfair Competition § 12:1 (4th ed.).  “Because they serve primarily 
to describe products rather than identify their sources, generic 
terms are incapable of becoming trademarks, at least in connection 
with the products that they designate.”  Bos. Duck Tours, LP v. 
Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2008). 
“Generic terms are not registrable, and a registered mark may 
be canceled at any time on the grounds that it [is] generic.”  Park 
‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 193-94; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).  A mark 
may be cancelled regardless of whether the USPTO has deemed it 
“incontestable.”  See Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 195.12   
To determine whether a mark is generic, the Lanham Act directs 
courts to consider the mark’s “primary significance” to the 
“relevant public.”  15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).  Thus, a “mark is not 
generic merely because it has some significance to the public as 
                     
12 A registrant’s right to use a mark is deemed “incontestable” if, after 
the mark has been registered for five years, the registrant files an affidavit 
with the USPTO stating, among other things, that the registrant’s use of the 
mark has been continuous for five years.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1065. 
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an indication of the nature or class of an article.  In order to 
become generic the principal significance of the word must be its 
indication of the nature or class of an article, rather than an 
indication of its origin.”  Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 144 
(internal quotation marks omitted).13   
“Types of evidence to be considered in determining whether a 
mark is generic include: (1) dictionary definitions; (2) generic 
use of the term by competitors and other persons in the trade; (3) 
plaintiff’s own generic use; (4) generic use in the media; and (5) 
consumer surveys.”  Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 
F. Supp. 2d 286, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); accord Tiffany & Co. v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 994 F. Supp. 2d 474, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
2. Burden 
As an initial matter, the parties dispute who bears the 
ultimate burden of proving that “Universal Church” is generic. 
Although the party seeking to enforce a trademark generally 
bears the burden of establishing that it has a valid trademark, 
registering a mark creates a presumption of validity.  See Reese 
Pub. Co. v. Hampton Int’l Commc’ns, Inc., 620 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 
1980).  That presumption, however, only extends to the class of 
products and services listed in the registration statement.   See 
                     
13 The test for genericness is the same whether a mark becomes generic or 
is generic ab initio.  See Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 144. 
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Gameologist Grp., LLC v. Sci. Games Int’l, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 
141, 153–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he presumption of an exclusive 
right to use a registered mark extends only to the goods and 
services noted in a registration certificate.”), aff’d, 508 F. 
App’x 31 (2d Cir. 2013).  Therefore, the question of who bears the 
burden turns on whether plaintiff is attempting to enforce its 
trademark within the class of services for which it was registered. 
The “Universal Church” trademark is registered for 
“evangelistic and ministerial services, namely conducting 
religious worship services.”  We interpret this class broadly,14 
and find that defendants’ use of the trademark falls within it.15  
While it is true that defendants are not a traditional church, 
their core business is ordaining ministers, which is a “ministerial 
                     
14 Beyond the expansive language used in the class definition, a broad 
interpretation is supported by the fact that plaintiff’s counsel disclaimed 
that the word “evangelistic” limited the class’s scope.  Oral Arg. Tr. (ECF No. 
138) at 4:13-24.  Moreover, plaintiff has attempted to enforce its trademarks 
against a wide range of religious (and apparently even some non-religious) 
organizations, suggesting that it also interprets the class broadly.  See 
Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 4 (cease-and-desist letters sent to, among 
others, The Universal Church, Inc., One Life Universal Church, Universal Church 
of Metaphysics, Inc., Universal Church of God, Inc., Universal Church of 
Fellowship, American Universal Church, Inc., First Universal Church of 
Knowledge, Universal Church of God in Christ, Inc., Universal Church of Truth 
Consciousness, Universal Church of Baba’s Kitchen, Inc., Maxam Universal Church, 
Pentecostal Universal Church, The Universal Church of God Inc., Universal Church 
of Salvation, Universal Church of God, Universal Church of the Living God, 
Universal Church of God and Action, Universal Church of God and Christ, 
Universal Church of God in Christ, Inc., Universal Church of Jesus Christ, 
Universal Church of Olodumare, Inc., Universal Church of Christ, Inc., The 
Universal Church of Mind-Body Enlightenment, and The Universal Church Assembly 
of First-Born). 
15 We find the same with respect to “The Universal Church” mark, which is 
registered for use in “religious counseling and ministerial services,” among 
other things.  Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 5(c). 
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service.”  See “Ordain,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 
(10th ed. 1996) (defining “ordain” as “to invest officially . . . 
with ministerial or priestly authority”).  Accordingly, plaintiff 
is entitled to a presumption of validity, i.e., that its “Universal 
Church” mark is not generic.   
3. Application 
Despite this presumption, we find that “universal” is generic 
as applied to churches.  The following facts are not genuinely in 
dispute.16  First, defendants presented evidence that “universal” 
is understood as referring to the entire Christian Church or all 
Christians collectively.  For example, the Oxford English 
Dictionary includes a definition of “universal” as “[d]esignating 
the whole Christian Church or all Christians collectively; = 
                     
16 In considering the evidence, we keep in mind that test for genericness 
is the mark’s primary significance to the “relevant public.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1064(3).  Since plaintiff has registered the mark for “evangelistic and 
ministerial services, namely, conducting religious worship services,” the 
relevant public is extremely broad and includes all those who seek out and 
provide religious worship services, including all Christians.  We therefore 
reject plaintiff’s argument that the relevant public should be construed 
narrowly as only Pentecostal and Charismatic Christians.  See Pl.’s Supp. Mem. 
(ECF No. 133) at 4 n.6; cf. Pl.’s Opp. MSJ (ECF No. 113) at 8, 21.   
 
The parties also dispute whether “consumer” surveys are relevant to the 
question of genericness.  While the relevant public here does not include 
“consumers” as that word is used in sense of a commercial product or service, 
we see no reason why the parties could not have conducted surveys of how the 
relevant public understands plaintiff’s mark.  Nevertheless, the failure to 
produce a survey is not fatal, especially since defendants claim that the mark 
was generic ab initio.  See Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 
605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1979) (consumers surveys not necessary to establish 
“the meaning of a familiar English word”); Horizon Mills Corp. v. Qvc, Inc., 
161 F. Supp. 2d 208, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (where “the term was generic before 
the seller used it,” “[a]n individual challenging the mark need only establish 
that the term is generic through an examination of the term itself”).   
Case 1:14-cv-05213-NRB   Document 141   Filed 08/08/17   Page 17 of 46
18 
 
CATHOLIC . . . Freq. in universal church.”  Zibas Decl. (ECF No. 
91), Ex. N.  As the dictionary notes, “universal” in this sense 
has a similar meaning to “catholic,” id., which is simply the 
transliteration of the Greek word for “universal,” “καθολικός” or 
“katholikos.”  “Catholic,” Oxford English Dictionary Online (June 
2017).   
While the parties disagree on how widespread this 
understanding is, they agree that it is well-established within 
the Roman Catholic Church and that at least some non-Catholics 
understand and use the term in this sense.  See Zibas Decl. (ECF 
No. 91), Ex. R at 30 (“[T]he phrase ‘Universal Church’ is a 
standard, hallowed usage in the Catholic Church as well as in many 
other Churches to refer to the Church as a world-wide reality.”); 
Irvin Decl. (ECF No. 96), Ex. A at 9 (“[The term ‘universal 
church’] refers specifically to the Roman Catholic Church in 
Catholic teachings, and is part of the claim made in official Roman 
Catholic theology that other churches or communions are not even 
‘churches’ in a proper sense.”); id. at 5 (recognizing “occasional” 
use of the term by Lutherans and Methodists); see also Def.’s 56.1 
(ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 75-76.17 
                     
17 To the extent that plaintiff argues that a word’s historic use is 
irrelevant to whether it is generic, plaintiff is wrong.  See, e.g., Harley 
Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1999) (examining 
historic use of “hog” in finding that it was generic as applied to motorcycles); 
E. Air Lines, Inc. v. N.Y. Air Lines, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1270, 1274-76 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983) (analyzing historic use of “shuttle” in finding that it was generic).   
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Moreover, “universal” has been used in this sense for hundreds 
of years, and even thousands of years if the original Latin and 
Greek versions are considered.  See Zibas Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex. 
N; see generally id., Ex. R.   
Second, defendants presented evidence that numerous churches 
use “universal” and “universal church” in their name.  See Def.’s 
56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 87-89.  For example, defendants’ search of 
organizations registered to do business in New York shows that the 
“Universal Church of the Spirit, Inc.” was registered in 1935, the 
“Universal Church of God, Fire Baptized, Inc.” was registered in 
1945, the “Universal Church of Christ” was registered in 1980, the 
“Universal Church Development Corp.” was registered in 1981, and 
the “Universal Church of Life” was registered in 1997.  See Zibas 
Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex. X.  Similarly, defendants’ search of 
organizations registered to do business in California shows that 
“The Universal Church of the New Birth” was registered in 1966, 
the “Universal Church of God and Institute of Applied Religious 
Sciences” was registered in 1983, and the “Universal Church of 
Religious Freedom” was registered in 1989.  See id.  Neither list 
is exhaustive.  Defendants produced similar search results for 
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
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and Pennsylvania, identifying almost 100 active or inactive 
entities using “universal church” in their names.  Id.18   
Third, “universal” is used in the name of the denomination, 
Unitarian Universalism, see Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶ 62, while 
“universal’s” etymological counterpart, “catholic,” is used in the 
name of the largest Christian denomination, the Roman Catholic 
Church.   
In contrast, there is little evidence that the relevant public 
understands “Universal Church” as referring to plaintiff, despite 
the fact that the USPTO registered the mark as having achieved 
secondary meaning and subsequently granted it incontestable 
status.  For example, plaintiff claims that it uses the mark in 
connection with its 230 physical locations and weekly broadcasts 
that reach 800,000 people.  See Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶¶ 7, 9-
11.  This claim is based largely on the testimony from plaintiff’s 
own employees.  See, e.g., Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 11 at 
83:19-84:2 (“[W]e promote this brand, this name all over the media, 
our locations, even in front of each location of ours.  We always 
try to promote the name of the church and the buildings we own and 
we lease.  I would say that the Universal Church is pretty much 
known as the church as we are.”); id., Ex. 12 at 38:19-21 (“[W]e 
                     
18 Plaintiff’s argument that there is no evidence that these entities are 
recognized by consumers or use “universal church” in commerce, see Pl.’s Opp. 
MSJ (ECF No. 113) at 18, is undermined by the fact that plaintiff sent cease-
and desist letters to similar organizations, see supra n.13.   
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use [‘Universal Church’] when we evangelize, when we have 
brochures, flyers, newspapers, tee shirts.”); id. at 39:2-10 (“I 
believe that when you use the words Universal Church, everyone 
thinks of us.  Q. And what makes you say that?  A. Just because, 
Universal Church, everybody knows it as us.  That’s the name we 
use when we do advertising, when we do T.V. programs, it’s all 
over the place and has been in the United States since 1987.”).19  
However, “little probative value” attaches to such testimony 
because “[t]rademark law is skeptical of the ability of an 
associate of a trademark holder to transcend personal biases to 
give an impartial account of the value of the holder’s mark.”  
Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-
Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Jewish 
Sephardic Yellow Pages, Ltd. v. DAG Media, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 
340, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (same).20  
                     
19 Apart from the newsletter discussed below, plaintiff submitted no 
documentary evidence showing that it uses the “Universal Church” mark on 
brochures, flyers, newspapers, or tee shirts. 
20 Much of the testimony that plaintiff cites is also irrelevant because 
it does not specifically address plaintiff’s use of the “Universal Church” mark 
or distinguish between plaintiff’s use of “Universal Church” versus “Universal 
Church of the Kingdom of God.”  See, e.g., Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 11 
at 21:5-14 (“Q Is there more than one location?  A Yes  Q How many locations 
does The Universal Church, Inc. have?  A We have around 230.  Q Are those 
locations all in the U.S.?  A Yes.”); see also id. at 29:22-32:18, 30:11-32:18, 
34:9-36:4, 47:13-18, 72:14-22, 83:12-84:2, 86:20-23; id., Ex. 13 at 23:7-13, 
43:6-44:9.  
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There is also little documentary evidence to support the 
claim.  Plaintiff submitted the below photograph, which shows “The 
Universal Church” mark on one of its churches: 
 
See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 15.21  Plaintiff also submitted 
a newsletter that it publishes called “Universal News,” which 
contains sporadic references to the “Universal Church” in the text 
and a Facebook link to “Like us: The Universal Church”: 
 
                     
21 Plaintiff submitted three other photographs of its church fronts, but 
one of the photographs is indiscernible and the other two use the Spanish 
version of the “Universal Church of the Kingdom of God” name rather than 
“Universal Church.”  See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 15.  
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See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 8.   
Plaintiff was also unable to substantiate its claim that its 
weekly broadcast reach 800,000 figure, see Zibas Decl. (ECF No. 
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117), Ex. A at 2 (letter from plaintiff’s counsel to defense 
counsel noting that plaintiff was “not aware of any written 
documentation [regarding the weekly viewership of plaintiff’s 
services] at this time”), a figure that appears high given that 
plaintiff only has approximately 30,000 U.S. members.   
But even if we were to accept plaintiff’s claim that plaintiff 
uses the “Universal Church” mark in connection with its physical 
churches and broadcasts, it does little to show how the mark is 
understood by the vast majority of the “relevant public” who do 
not belong to plaintiff’s church.  With respect to those 
individuals, the only evidence in plaintiff’s favor appears to be 
two articles referring to plaintiff as the “Universal Church.”  See 
Zibas Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex. EE (N.Y. Post article); Daniels Decl. 
(ECF No. 123), Ex. 23 (N.Y. Times article).22  Thus, we find that 
there is virtually no evidence in the record that anyone in the 
relevant public, outside plaintiff’s own members, understands 
“Universal Church” as referring to plaintiff.   
                     
22 Again, the record contains numerous other articles that are irrelevant, 
either because they do not use the “Universal Church” name or because they refer 
to plaintiff’s Brazilian affiliate rather than plaintiff.  See Zibas Decl. (ECF 
No. 91), Ex. EE; Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 6.  Likewise, plaintiff points 
to an entry in The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic 
Movements for the “Universal Church of The Kingdom of God” that uses the 
shorthand “Universal Church” to refer to the subject of the article.  See 
Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 17.  But as plaintiff concedes, the entry 
describes plaintiff’s Brazilian affiliate, not plaintiff.  See Pl.’s Opp. MSJ 
(ECF No. 113) at 5. 
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Based on this record, we hold that the primary significance 
of “universal church” to the relevant public is a type of church 
rather than plaintiff, namely one that considers itself to be 
universal in the sense of representing the entire Christian church.  
See Self-Realization Fellowship Church, 59 F.3d at 909-10 (finding 
that “Self–Realization Fellowship Church” was generic because the 
“evidence suggests that a ‘Self-realization’ organization is a 
class of organization dedicated to spiritual attainment in the 
manner taught by Yoga, not an organization that is part of 
[plaintiff’s] chain of churches”); see also Rudolph Int’l, Inc. v. 
Realys, Inc., 482 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Our review of 
the record amply supports the district court’s conclusions [that 
‘disinfectable’ as applied to nail files is generic].  The district 
court correctly found that the term ‘disinfectable’ has a history 
of established use as a generic adjective within the nail care 
industry as well as in other fields such as medicine and dentistry. 
For example, the district court noted that ‘disinfectable’ is 
included in at least 25 patents issued since 2001.”); Miller 
Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80-81 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (finding that “light” had “been widely used in the beer 
industry for many years” to describe certain beer characteristics, 
that such use “long antedated” plaintiff’s, and concluding that 
“even if Miller had given its light beer a characteristic not found 
in other light beers, it could not acquire the exclusive right to 
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use the common descriptive word ‘light’ as a trademark for that 
beer”).23 
In reaching this holding, we are guided by the policies behind 
trademark law.  See E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper Labs., 
Inc., 536 F. Supp. 523, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[W]hether a term is 
generic or descriptive as applied to a particular article should 
be resolved by reference to the policies for refusing any 
protection to some terms . . . .”).   
By their very nature, trademarks give holders a monopoly over 
the right to use certain terms in describing their products or 
services.  However, trademark law is not intended to create 
a monopoly over a particularly effective marketing 
phrase.  Instead the law grants a monopoly over a phrase 
only if and to the extent it is necessary to enable 
consumers to distinguish one producer’s goods from 
others and even then only if the grant of such a monopoly 
will not substantially disadvantage competitors by 
preventing them from describing the nature of their 
goods.  Accordingly, if a term is necessary to describe 
a product characteristic that a competitor has a right 
to copy, a producer may not effectively preempt 
competition by claiming that term as its own. 
                     
23 The fact that “Universal” does not name a religion is not dispositive.  
Although some courts have applied such a test, see Gen. Conference Corp. of 
Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 413 (6th Cir. 2010); TE-TA-MA 
Truth Found.--Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of Creator, 297 F.3d 662, 666 
(7th Cir. 2002), there are many ways to classify a church other than by the 
religion it practices.  For example, “Spanish church” would surely be generic 
as describing a category of Spanish-language churches, even though there is no 
denomination known as the “Spanish Church.”  Cf. GMT Prods., L.P. v. Cablevision 
of N.Y. City, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 207, 210-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the 
“Arabic Channel,” as a channel broadcasting in Arabic, was generic). 
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Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 144 (quoting A.J. Canfield Co. v. 
Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 1986)); see also CES Pub. 
Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(“To allow trademark protection for generic terms, i.e., names 
which describe the genus of goods being sold, even when these have 
become identified with a first user, would grant the owner of the 
mark a monopoly, since a competitor could not describe his goods 
as what they are.”); cf. Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 80-81 
(“Other brewers whose beers have qualities that make them ‘light’ 
as that word has commonly been used remain free to call their beer 
‘light.’  Otherwise a manufacturer could remove a common 
descriptive word from the public domain by investing his goods 
with an additional quality, thus gaining the exclusive right to 
call his wine ‘rosé,’ his whiskey ‘blended,’ or his bread 
‘white.’”). 
Here, finding that “universal church” is generic would grant 
plaintiff a monopoly over the word “universal” as used in church 
names, a monopoly which plaintiff has already indicated that it 
would enforce aggressively.  See supra n.13 (listing cease-and-
desist letters sent by plaintiff).  We are persuaded that the 
trademark law is simply not intended to allow the mark to be 
weaponized by plaintiff in this way.24 
                     
24 Plaintiff argues that if “universal” is generic as applied to churches, 
then the Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church, and the Catholic Church 
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Finally, we note that our holding does not turn on the fact 
that plaintiff is a non-profit church rather than a for-profit 
company.  As the parties agreed at oral argument, there is no 
separate trademark law that applies to non-profits or religious 
organizations.  See Oral Arg. Tr. (ECF No. 138) at 14:19-24.  And 
as plaintiff points out, church names frequently receive trademark 
protection.  See Pl.’s Supp. Mem. (ECF No. 133) at 4 n.5.  However, 
even a cursory examination of the church names that have been 
registered reveals that they are far more distinctive than 
“Universal Church.”  Id.25 
B. There Is No Likelihood of Confusion 
Even if we were to find that “Universal Church” is descriptive 
rather than generic, plaintiff’s trademark claims would still fail 
because no reasonable juror could find a likelihood of confusion. 
1. Standard 
To prevail on its federal trademark claims, plaintiff must 
show that there is a likelihood of confusion as to the origin or 
sponsorship of defendants’ services.  Virgin Enters. Ltd., 335 
                     
must also be generic names.  Whatever the merits of that argument, we need not 
and, indeed, cannot decide it on the record before us. 
25 Examples of church names that have been trademarked include the Church 
of Religion of God, Divine Church of God, The World’s Church of the Living God, 
Church of God Ministry of Jesus Christ, The United States Church, The Lord of 
the Universe Church, The Church of Good Karma, Church of God in Christ, Living 
Church of God, True Jesus Church, Church of the King, Christ’s Sanctified Holy 
Church, The Episcopal Church, New Apostolic Church, and United Church of God 
and Worldwide Church of God.  See Pl.’s Supp. Mem. at 4 n.5. 
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F.3d at 146.  Likelihood of confusion exists when “there is any 
likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent 
purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as 
to the source of the goods in question.”  Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. 
R. G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978).   
To determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion, we 
apply the multi-factor balancing test articulated by Judge 
Friendly in Polaroid Corporation v. Polarad Electronics 
Corporation, 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).  See New Kayak Pool 
Corp. v. R&P Pools, Inc., 246 F.3d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 2001).  The 
Polaroid factors are (1) the strength of the mark; (2) evidence of 
actual confusion; (3) the sophistication of the relevant public; 
(4) the degree of similarity between the two marks; (5) the 
proximity of the services; (6) the likelihood that the prior owner 
will bridge the gap between its services and defendants’; (7) 
defendants’ bad faith; and (8) the quality of defendants’ services.  
Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495.  
Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of establishing confusion 
at trial.  See Medisim Ltd. v. BestMed LLC, 910 F. Supp. 2d 591, 
606 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Generally speaking, establishing that 
probability is the plaintiff’s burden, which means that the 
defendant typically does not need to disprove a likelihood of 
confusion.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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“Summary judgment based on likelihood of confusion under the 
Polaroid analysis is appropriate where the undisputed evidence 
would lead only to one conclusion.”   Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Walgreen 
Co., 695 F. Supp. 2d 125, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The issue “is not how many factors favor each 
side but whether a reasonable trier of fact might differ as to 
likelihood of confusion.”  Id. 
2. Strength of Plaintiff’s Trademark  
Even if we were to find that “Universal Church” is descriptive 
rather than generic, we would still find it to be a weak mark.   
“When determining whether a . . . descriptive mark is a strong 
one for purposes of the Polaroid inquiry, we look to the secondary 
meaning that the mark has acquired.”  The Sports Auth., Inc. v. 
Prime Hosp. Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 961 (2d Cir. 1996).  “Secondary 
meaning attaches when the name and the business have become 
synonymous in the mind of the public, submerging the primary 
meaning of the term in favor of its meaning as a word identifying 
that business.”  Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 
390 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
determining whether a mark has acquired secondary meaning, courts 
have considered (1) length and exclusivity of use; (2) advertising 
expenditures; (3) consumer studies linking the product to product 
source; (4) sales success; (5) unsolicited media coverage of the 
product; (6) attempts to plagiarize.  See Thompson Med. Co. v. 
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Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1985).  Even where a mark 
has achieved incontestable status, “independent indicia of 
strength [are] relevant to deciding whether the strength of the 
mark weighs in favor or against a finding of likelihood of 
confusion under Polaroid.”  The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 961. 
We find that there is little evidence that “Universal Church” 
has acquired a strong secondary meaning as referring to plaintiff.  
As discussed above, plaintiff has neither used the mark exclusively 
nor as long as many other churches; the phrase “universal church” 
has been used for millennia to refer to the entire Christian 
Church or Christian community, as well as in the name of numerous 
other churches; “universal” is used in the name of the Christian 
denomination, Unitarian Universalism; and the word’s etymological 
counterpart, “catholic,” is used in the name of Christianity’s 
most populous religion.  See supra at 17-20. 
In contrast, plaintiff has only been using the mark since 
1987, only has 30,000 members, and there is little evidence in the 
record that anyone outside plaintiff’s church refers to it as the 
“Universal Church.”  See supra at 21-25. 
With respect to media coverage, we noted above that there are 
only two articles in the record that refer to plaintiff by the 
“Universal Church” name, while the remaining articles in the record 
either refer to plaintiff by its longer name or to plaintiff’s 
Brazilian affiliate.  See supra at 25. 
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None of the remaining factors to be considered in analyzing 
secondary meaning are helpful to plaintiff.  There is no evidence 
in the record regarding plaintiff’s advertising expenditures.  See 
Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶ 138.  Nor is there any evidence that 
plaintiff’s mark has been widely plagiarized.  See Pl.’s Opp. MSJ 
(ECF No. 113) at 19-20.26  Although plaintiff claims that it 
occasionally publishes and sells books, audiovisual materials, and 
other items incidental to its ministry, see Pl.’s Opp. 56.1 (ECF 
No. 114) ¶ 6, there does not appear to be any evidence of the 
amount of such sales or that the materials use the “Universal 
Church” mark.  Finally, while plaintiff conducted a survey, the 
survey was intended to measure confusion rather than whether the 
relevant public associates the “Universal Church” mark with 
plaintiff.  See Cornerstone Decl. (ECF No. 114), Ex. A at 6; Pl.’s 
Opp. 56.1 (ECF No. 114) ¶ 127 (“People were told that they were 
looking for information about a church called ‘The Universal 
Church’ even if they had no prior knowledge of Plaintiff.”).   
Accordingly, we find that the “Universal Church” mark is 
weak.27   
                     
26 Plaintiff argues that defendants’ conduct at issue here constitutes an 
instance of plagiarism.  See Pl.’s Opp. MSJ (ECF No. 113) at 19-20.  However, 
as discussed below in the context of whether defendants acted in bad faith, see 
infra at II.B.7, we find that there is little evidence that defendants 
intentionally copied plaintiff’s mark.  Moreover, a single example hardly 
constitutes widespread plagiarizing. 
27 As a result, the USPTO should not have registered the mark or 
subsequently granted it incontestable status.  See Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 
193-94 (A “descriptive” mark “may be registered only if the registrant shows 
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3. Evidence of Actual Confusion 
Although plaintiff claims that there is “overwhelming” 
evidence of actual confusion, we find that there is little to none 
in the record.  At most, plaintiff’s evidence suggests that someone 
searching the Internet for “universal church” will sometimes land 
on defendants’ website.  However, the evidence generally fails to 
establish (1) that this occurs because of defendants’ use of the 
“Universal Church” mark or (2) that individuals searching for 
“universal church” are actually searching for plaintiff.  More 
importantly, there is no evidence that anyone purchasing 
defendants’ ordination services was confused by defendants’ 
alleged use of “Universal Church.”  
Plaintiff’s evidence consists of a survey, testimony from its 
30(b)(6) witness and plaintiff’s expert, and a Facebook message.  
Plaintiff’s survey attempts to measure the extent to which someone 
googling “the universal church” would believe that he had landed 
on a website for an entity called “The Universal Church.”  See 
Cornerstone Decl. (ECF No. 114), Ex. A.  However, we find the 
survey of limited value since the survey takers were simply told 
that they were searching for a generic entity named “The Universal 
                     
that it has acquired secondary meaning, i.e., it has become distinctive of the 
applicant’s goods in commerce.” (emphasis added)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) 
(The USPTO “may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become 
distinctive . . . proof of substantially exclusive . . . use thereof as a mark 
by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the 
claim of distinctiveness is made.” (emphasis added)). 
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Church,” without any attempt to measure whether the survey takers 
associated such an entity with plaintiff.  See id.; Pl.’s Opp. 
56.1 (ECF No. 114) ¶ 127. 
Plaintiff’s vice president and 30(b)(6) witness testified 
that “many” of its pastors and members “had a hard time trying to 
reach our correct Web site while they were searching for our 
domain.”  See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 11 at 69:9-14; id. 
at 72:22-73:4.28  As an initial matter, the testimony is entitled 
to little weight since it comes from defendants’ vice-president, 
an interested party.  See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian 
Journal Publications, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“Evidence of secondary meaning from a partial source possesses 
very limited probative value.”); Jewish Sephardic Yellow Pages, 
Ltd. v. DAG Media, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 340, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(same).  Moreover, such testimony is simply too vague to establish 
that anyone was actually confused between the services that 
plaintiff and defendants offered or that such confusion resulted 
from defendants’ use of plaintiff’s trademarks, as opposed to, for 
                     
28 Defendants argue that the testimony is inadmissible hearsay.  However, 
the Second Circuit has permitted testimony describing other individuals’ 
confusion in trademark cases on the grounds that the testimony is not being 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show the consumers’ 
state of mind.  See Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 
1003-04 (2d Cir. 1997).  
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example, defendants’ non-infringing search optimization 
strategies.29 
Plaintiff also points to a message that it received on its 
Facebook page from an individual who mistakenly believed that he 
had been ordained by plaintiff in 1972, well before plaintiff’s 
church was in operation.  Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 52; Daniels 
Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 13 at 41:13-42:16.  However, the 
individual did not say who he believed he had been ordained by, 
and therefore it is impossible to know whether his confusion even 
involves defendants. 
Finally, plaintiff claims that defendants’ expert found five 
instances of actual confusion and testified that he could find a 
“much, much, much, much, much higher number” if given additional 
time.  See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 18 at 80:15-18.  
However, contrary to plaintiff’s characterization, the expert was 
describing instances where individuals “refer[red] to the 
defendants by the misnomer Universal Church.”  Id. at 78:15-80:18; 
see also Zibas Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex. CC at 22 (“There are several 
                     
29 Such confusion might be relevant to “initial interest confusion,” 
something neither party addressed in their briefing.  See Savin Corp. v. Savin 
Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 462 n.13 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[Initial interest confusion] 
arises when a consumer who searches for the plaintiff’s website with the aid of 
a search engine is directed instead to the defendant’s site because of a 
similarity in the parties’ website addresses.”).  However, we question whether 
initial interest confusion is even relevant here.  See Network Automation, Inc. 
v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause 
the sine qua non of trademark infringement is consumer confusion,” even under 
an initial interest confusion theory, “the owner of the mark must demonstrate 
likely confusion, not mere diversion.”). 
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examples where people, without any prompting or connection with 
Defendant, will refer to the Defendant as ‘Universal Church’ by 
unintentionally omitting the word ‘life’ from Defendant’s name.”).  
Such “confusion” is not relevant to plaintiff’s trademark claim 
because “universal church” is not being used in any way to refer 
to plaintiff.30   
4. Similarity of the Trademarks 
Defendants are using the same words that comprise plaintiff’s 
mark.  Accordingly, this factor favors plaintiff.   
5. Proximity of the Services in the Marketplace 
In considering proximity, “direct competition between the 
products is not a prerequisite to relief”; at the same time 
“products that share the same channel of trade are not necessarily 
proximate.”  The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 963 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  This factor favors defendants.  Although both 
parties are nominally churches, they offer different services.  
While plaintiff is a traditional church offering spiritual 
                     
30 In the defendants’ expert’s examples, “universal church” was used to 
refer either to defendants or to the Roman Catholic notion of a universal 
church.  See Zibas Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex. CC at 22 (website discussing legal 
opinion that “take[s] note of the unconventional methods of becoming ordained 
as a minister via the Universal Church Life Website”); id. (question posted on 
a forum ndnation.com, which describes itself as “The independent voice of Notre 
Dame Athletics,” asking whether, “As a Catholic, is it possible to become 
ordained through some sort of universal church without renouncing my commitment 
to Catholicism?”); id. at 23 (comment to an online article discussing 
Representative Nancy Pelosi’s views on Catholicism where the comment refers to 
Rep. Pelosi as a “self proclaimed Theologian & Doctor of the Universal Church”); 
id. at 23-25 (websites identifying various wedding officiants who were ordained 
by defendants but described themselves as being ordained by the “Universal 
Church” or the “Universal Church of Light”). 
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services to its members, defendant primarily offers online 
ordinations so that its members can perform weddings and other 
religious ceremonies for non-members, something plaintiff does not 
do.  See Zibas Decl., Ex. B at 67:25-68:12 (“Q Does Universal 
Church offer the same services as the defendants?  A . . . I read 
in their Web site that they offer some strange way to ordain people 
online which is completely different than we usually do as a 
church.  Q So Universal Church doesn’t offer ordinations; is that 
correct?  A We don’t offer ordinations online.”). 
6. Likelihood that the Plaintiff Will “Bridge 
the Gap” 
“The term ‘bridging the gap’ is used to describe the senior 
user’s interest in preserving avenues of expansion and entering 
into related fields.”  C.L.A.S.S. Promotions, Inc. v. D.S. 
Magazines, Inc., 753 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1985).  This factor 
favors defendants.  As just noted, plaintiff does not currently 
offer online ordination and there is no indication that it will do 
so in the future.   
7. Defendants’ Bad Faith  
“Under this factor, we look to whether the defendant adopted 
its mark with the intention of capitalizing on plaintiff’s 
reputation and goodwill and any confusion between his and the 
senior user’s product.”  The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 964 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Although we believe this factor favors 
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defendant, a reasonable juror could come out either way.  On one 
hand, plaintiff does not contest defendants’ right to use the name 
“Universal Life Church,” and therefore defendants have a 
legitimate, good faith reason to use “universal” and “church” in 
their search engine optimization strategies.  Moreover, it is 
difficult to imagine what benefit or motive defendants would have 
to trade off plaintiff’s goodwill.31  On the other hand, a 
reasonable juror could find that defendants’ use of the mark 
“universal church” in various domain names, on their website, in 
metadata, and in search terms, could be construed as evidence of 
an intent to capture Internet users looking for plaintiff’s 
organization.  Because a reasonable juror could find this factor 
in either parties’ favor, we assume that it points in plaintiff’s 
favor for purposes of summary judgment. 
8. Quality of Defendants’ Services 
“Generally, quality is weighed as a factor when there is an 
allegation that a low quality product is taking unfair advantage 
of the public good will earned by a well-established high quality 
product.”  Gruner + Jahr USA Pub., a Div. of Gruner + Jahr Printing 
& Pub. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir. 1993) 
                     
31 When asked at oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel could only suggest 
that defendants were “vindictive” because they were denied their trademark 
application by the USPTO.  Oral Arg. Tr. (ECF No. 138) at 28:10-18.  However, 
this theory amounts to little more than speculation, which courts will not 
consider on summary judgment.  See Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 
(2d Cir. 1986) (“Nor may a party rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to 
the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.”). 
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Plaintiff argues that defendants’ ordination services are 
inferior because they allow anyone to become ordained online 
without committing to a particular teaching or faith, without 
formal education, without training, and without committing to 
attend to the spiritual needs of others.  See Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 
102) at 25.  On the other hand, the features that plaintiff views 
disparagingly are likely the very features that defendants’ 
customers value.  Thus, we find that defendants’ services are not 
inherently inferior.  Moreover, there is no evidence in the record 
that defendants are taking advantage of plaintiff’s public 
goodwill.  Accordingly, we find that this factor favors defendants. 
9. Sophistication of the Relevant Public 
This factor also favors defendants.  As discussed above, the 
relevant public is the audience for religious worship services.  
Such individuals are unlikely to confuse plaintiff’s religious 
services——offered in its physical churches and through weekly 
broadcasts——with defendants’ online ordination services.   
10. Conclusion  
In sum, the majority of the factors point in defendants’ 
favor: (1) the “Universal Church” mark is weak; (2) there is little 
to no evidence of actual, actionable confusion; (3) the parties’ 
services are not in close proximity; (4) it appears unlikely that 
plaintiff will “bridge the gap”; (5) defendants’ services are not 
inferior; and (6) the relevant public is sufficiently 
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sophisticated so as not to be confused.  In contrast, only two 
factors——the similarity of the marks and evidence of bad faith——
favor plaintiff for purposes of summary judgment.  Based on this 
balance, we find that there is no likelihood of confusion as a 
matter of law.  See, e.g., Medici Classics Prods., LLC v. Medici 
Grp., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting 
summary judgment to defendant under Polaroid where only two factors 
pointed “weakly” in plaintiff’s favor).  Accordingly, we hold that 
even if “Universal Church” were descriptive rather than generic, 
plaintiff’s trademark infringement claims would still fail. 
III. Federal Cybersquatting Claim 
“To successfully assert a claim under the [Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act], a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) 
its marks were distinctive at the time the domain name was 
registered; (2) the infringing domain names complained of are 
identical to or confusingly similar to plaintiff’s mark; and (3) 
the infringer has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark.”  
Webadviso v. Bank of Am. Corp., 448 Fed. App’x 95, 97 (2d Cir. 
2011); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). 
Because we found that the “Universal Church” mark is generic 
and therefore not “distinctive,” see supra II.A, plaintiff’s 
cybersquatting claim must fail as well.  However, even if 
“Universal Church” were not generic, plaintiff’s primary 
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cybersquatting claim would still fail because the mark was not 
distinctive at the time universalchurch.org was registered.   
As noted above, a descriptive mark is only considered 
“distinctive” if it has acquired secondary meaning, see Park ‘N 
Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. at 194, i.e., it has come through use to be 
“uniquely associated with a single source,” PaperCutter, Inc. v. 
Fay’s Drug Co., 900 F.2d 558, 564 (2d Cir. 1990).  Secondary 
meaning must be acquired “before [plaintiff’s] competitor 
commenced use of the mark.”  Id.   
The primary domain name at issue, universalchurch.org was 
registered by defendants in 2010, Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 24, 
well before the “Universal Church” mark achieved incontestable 
status in February 2012, id. at ¶ 5(a).  Accordingly, the mark’s 
incontestable status is irrelevant to the mark’s degree of 
distinctiveness when defendants’ registered the domain name.  For 
the reasons set forth above——and especially in light of the long 
and varied use of “universal” by churches, see supra at 17-20——we 
find that “Universal Church” had not acquired secondary meaning as 
referring to plaintiff at the times universalchurch.org was 
registered in 2010.32 
                     
32 A similar argument would apply to most of the remaining domain names, 
all but two of which——universalchurch.net and theuniversalchurch.org——were 
registered after February 2012.  See Kent Decl. (ECF No. 95), Ex. 1 ¶¶ 84-97. 
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IV. New York Unfair Competition Claims 
Because the standards for New York common law unfair 
competition and trademark infringement claims are essentially the 
same as under the Lanham Act, see Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 
v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 220 F. Supp. 2d 289, 297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), we dismiss plaintiff’s New York common law claims for the 
same reasons as above.  
V. New York General Business Law Claims 
Plaintiff asserts claims under Sections 349 and 350 of the 
New York General Business Law (the “NYGBL”).  NYGBL § 349 prohibits 
“[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, 
trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this 
state.”  N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a).  NYGBL § 350 prohibits 
“[f]alse advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or 
commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state.”  Id. 
§ 350.  “To successfully assert a claim under either section, a 
plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-
oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) 
plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive 
act or practice.”  Orlander v. Staples, Inc., 802 F.3d 289, 300 
(2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Although only plaintiff moved for summary judgment on its 
NYGBL claims, we nevertheless grant summary judgment to defendants 
and dismiss the claims because they fail as a matter of law.33   
“[T]he majority view in this Circuit is that trademark or 
trade dress infringement claims are not cognizable under §§ 349 
and 350 of the New York General Business Law unless there is a 
specific and substantial injury to the public interest over and 
above ordinary trademark infringement or dilution.”  Nomination Di 
Antonio E Paolo Gensini S.N.C. v. H.E.R. Accessories Ltd., No. 07 
CIV.6959 (DAB), 2009 WL 4857605, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted); see also 
Kaplan, Inc. v. Yun, 16 F. Supp. 3d 341, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(“[C]ourts in New York have routinely dismissed trademark claims 
brought under Sections 349 and 350 as being outside the scope of 
the statutes, because ordinary trademark disputes do not pose a 
significant risk of harm to the public health or interest and are 
                     
33 “A sua sponte grant of summary judgment against the moving party is 
permissible only if ‘the facts before the district court were fully developed 
so that the moving party suffered no procedural prejudice’ and ‘the court is 
absolutely sure that no issue of material fact exists.’” Donachie v. Liberty 
Life Assur. Co. of Bos., 745 F.3d 41, 45 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Bridgeway 
Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration omitted).  
Where the moving party has not been “denied the opportunity to place all relevant 
evidence in the record,” a grant of summary judgment for the nonmoving party is 
“not procedurally deficient.”  Id.  Here, as noted above, plaintiff conceded 
that it has placed all relevant evidence in the record.  See supra n.2. 
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therefore not the type of deceptive conduct that the statutes were 
designed to address.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).34   
Here, plaintiff’s NYGBL claims are merely duplicative of its 
trademark claims and therefore do not allege an injury to the 
public interest “over and above” ordinary trademark infringement.   
Plaintiff argues that it has alleged an injury to the public 
beyond ordinary trademark confusion in that defendants’ “promotion 
of their ordination services” under the “Universal Church” mark 
“injures consumers ‘because they are inadvertently purchasing a 
product of inferior quality, a product they do not prefer, or 
both.’”  Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 102) at 28 (quoting Zip Int’l Grp., 
LLC v. Trilini Imports, Inc., No. 09-CV-2437 JG VVP, 2010 WL 
648696, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010)).   
                     
34 Plaintiff cites two cases, George Nelson Found. v. Modernica, Inc., 12 
F. Supp. 3d 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), and Zip Int’l Grp., LLC v. Trilini Imports, 
Inc., No. 09-CV-2437 JG VVP, 2010 WL 648696 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010), reflecting 
the minority position that ordinary trademark infringement allegations may be 
sufficient to state claims under NYGBL §§ 349 and 350.  Besides being in the 
clear minority, the decisions are entitled to little weight as they fail to 
recognize the majority position or even analyze whether ordinary trademark 
infringement claims may be brought under Sections 349 and 350.  Moreover, the 
court in Zip International subsequently backed away from its position.  As Judge 
Gleeson recognized in a later opinion in the same case, “[s]ome courts have 
held that trademark cases fall outside the scope of the New York’s consumer 
protection statute, reasoning that the public harm that results from trademark 
infringement is too insubstantial to satisfy the pleading requirements of § 349.  
Thus, Zip’s allegations may not even be actionable under the asserted provisions 
of New York law, an issue I need not address here.”  Zip Int’l Grp., LLC v. 
Trilini Imports, Inc., No. 09-CV-2437 JG VVP, 2011 WL 2132980, at *9 n.10 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011 May 24, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations 
omitted).  Accordingly, we do not believe these cases warrant rejecting the 
majority position. 
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However, there is no evidence in the record to support these 
allegations, which, frankly, we find implausible.  We are confident 
that defendants’ customers knew exactly what they were purchasing 
when they obtained free online ordinations and were unlikely to 
mistakenly believe they were ordained by plaintiff.  Moreover, 
even if confusion existed, the injury is precisely the type of 
injury that results from ordinary trademark confusion and does not 
constitute a separate public injury.  See DO Denim, LLC v. Fried 
Denim, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 403, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (assertion 
that “Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s designs causes injury to the 
public because ‘the consuming public needs to be free from 
competitive practices that deceive and therefore complicate 
consumers’ purchase decisions’” was “no different from the type of 
‘injury’ alleged in any garden variety trade dress infringement 
claim”). 
Plaintiff also argues that defendants’ conduct is 
distinguishable from ordinary trademark infringement because 
defendants have been “bombarding New Yorkers searching for The 
Universal Church online with advertisements for Defendants’ 
ordination services (which are not legally valid everywhere in the 
State)” and “have caused significant harm to the public interest 
by willfully attacking a duly registered trademark and attempting 
to render it invalid, rather than challenging it through legitimate 
channels.”  Pl.’s Reply MSJ (ECF No. 124) at 11-12.  Again——
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